The empirical study by Margaret Nelson, Rosanna Hertz, and Wendy Kramer on stakeholder attitudes toward gamete donor anonymity and limits on gamete donation, 'Gamete Donor Anonymity and Limits on Numbers of Offspring: The Views of Three Stakeholders' (hereafter Gamete Donor Anonymity),[^1^](#fn1){ref-type="fn"} is commendably particular on one level yet noticeably vague on another. It approaches the anonymity issue[^2^](#fn2){ref-type="fn"} at a level of particularity not typically seen in discussions about anonymity but does not identify with sufficient granularity either the harm of anonymity or the precise meaning of anonymity\'s antidote: non-anonymity. In addition, 'Gamete Donor Anonymity' does not raise what this commentary argues is a central question: whether the law ought to regulate a marginal reproductive practice in order to fulfill a normative ideal---genealogical knowledge, familial connection, or both---that is by no means guaranteed for any of us, *regardless of the mode of our conception*.

Part I offers some general observations about 'Gamete Donor Anonymity\'s' treatment of anonymity. Part II then turns to this commentary\'s principal observation regarding anonymity, namely, that anonymity anxiety might be part and parcel of a larger apparent phenomenon---origins anxiety, which denotes the fantasies, curiosity, and anxiety that many individuals appear to have about their roots---even as it emerges in discussions about anonymous gamete donation as the distinct discourse of a minority group. Part III uses the observation made in Part II to question the desirability and constitutional validity of regulating the practices of alternative reproduction in order to fulfill normative ideals about family, identity, and their interrelationship.

 . I. 'GAMETE DONOR ANONYMITY' ON ANONYMITY: GENERAL OBSERVATIONS {#sec2}
=================================================================

'Gamete Donor Anonymity' addresses the issue of anonymity at a refreshing level of particularity with respect to the group with which anonymity opponents and disclosure proponents are primarily concerned: donor offspring. Existing critiques of anonymity tend to conceptualize donor offspring in monolithic terms, viewing that group as an undifferentiated class---the 'donor conceived'---whose members uniformly yearn to know their genealogical roots and/or gain access to identifying information about their biological progenitors.[^3^](#fn3){ref-type="fn"} By contrast, 'Gamete Donor Anonymity' appraises anonymity\'s effects on donor offspring with a much sharper instrument by dividing that group into several subgroups, including younger versus older donor offspring and donor offspring from traditional, heterosexual families versus those from non-traditional families (eg gay/bisexual and/or unmarried).[^4^](#fn4){ref-type="fn"}

'Gamete Donor Anonymity\'s' granular approach to the question of anonymity vis-à-vis donor offspring yields telling results with important regulatory implications. The authors found that donor-conceived offspring who were both older and born to heterosexual couples were more likely to agree with the statement that 'donors should not be anonymous'[^5^](#fn5){ref-type="fn"} than were those who were both younger and born into a different family form---designated as 'other'.[^6^](#fn6){ref-type="fn"} If, as is the case, the 'major consumers of gamete donation' today are non-traditional parents (or 'other'),[^7^](#fn7){ref-type="fn"} then calls to eliminate anonymity in ways that would impose debilitating costs on alternative procreators[^8^](#fn8){ref-type="fn"} are ill-advised, especially if the children of those consumers are less opposed to, and even support, anonymity. The authors conclude: '\[T\]he data here suggest that the debate in the USA might have overstated the extent to which donor-conceived offspring uniformly prefer openness.'[^9^](#fn9){ref-type="fn"}

But where 'Gamete Donor Anonymity' is precise as to one important dimension of anonymity, it is, by its own admission, vague as to another: the meanings of anonymity and its presumed antidote, non-anonymity. The authors' survey asked respondents the extent to which they agreed with the statement that 'donors should not be anonymous'.[^10^](#fn10){ref-type="fn"} It did not, however, define 'anonymous' or 'anonymity' with any particularity;[^11^](#fn11){ref-type="fn"} as the authors acknowledge: 'Of course, it is impossible to know with these data precisely what kinds of interactions and relationships respondents believed would be possible and desirable if there were no anonymity.'[^12^](#fn12){ref-type="fn"} A non-anonymous donor might be one whose nominal identity is disclosed to donor offspring---the literal meaning of non-anonymous. It might be one whose health history or family\'s health history is made available to donor offspring.[^13^](#fn13){ref-type="fn"} Or, it might be one who over time develops a familial connection with his or her donor offspring. Without more context, it is impossible to know which aspects of anonymity troubled those respondents who viewed it negatively and which aspects of non-anonymity those respondents desired.

 . II. ANONYMITY ANXIETY: MINORITY DISCOURSE, UNIVERSAL PHENOMENON {#sec3}
==================================================================

Not only are the meanings of anonymity and non-anonymity---in this survey as in debates over gamete donor anonymity more generally---vague and imprecise, but the phenomenon with which they are associated, anonymity anxiety, is under-inclusive.[^14^](#fn14){ref-type="fn"} The critical commentary surrounding anonymous donation, including this study, tends to assume that anonymity anxiety and its associated feelings of identity confusion and familial disorientation are the peculiar consequence of non-traditional family formation, like anonymous donation.[^15^](#fn15){ref-type="fn"} At the very least, that commentary never explicitly considers whether anonymity anxiety is uniquely tied to alternative reproduction.

But what if anonymity anxiety and its attendant feelings of kinship obsession and alienation derive from something that is not unique to alternative reproduction?[^16^](#fn16){ref-type="fn"} What if the very anxiety that has come to be linked to alternative reproduction in critical commentary about alternative reproduction---and why it ought to be regulated more stringently than it currently is in the United States---is a more widespread feature of the human condition? What if many of us, *whether traditionally or alternatively conceived*, at one time or another fantasized about our familial origins and even experienced the feelings of rootlessness, alienation, and disorientation that have come to be identified over the past few years with a particular minority: the donor conceived?[^17^](#fn17){ref-type="fn"}

Consider in this regard some of the interpretations of the family offered by disciplines like psychoanalysis and literary criticism. To be sure, some of these disciplines, like Freudian psychoanalysis, have been sharply criticized in certain circles as promoting empirically unverifiable theories.[^18^](#fn18){ref-type="fn"} But the purported psychological condition associated with anonymity anxiety, 'genealogical bewilderment', has been critiqued on similar grounds.[^19^](#fn19){ref-type="fn"} Indeed, the sheer diversity of the 'family' as an institution would seem to guarantee that many of the theories on which commentators rely to explain it are incomplete. At the very least, then, psychoanalysis and other disciplines offer alternative narratives about the family that broaden our perspective of it. Most important here, those narratives offer a counterpoint to the critical discourse that surrounds anonymous gamete donation by suggesting that its perceived harms are not necessarily unique to families that are conceived in alternative ways.

For instance, in his 1909 essay 'Family Romances', Freud theorizes that most children, whether adopted or not, fantasize at some point in their psychological development that the parents who are raising them are not, in fact, their 'real' parents.[^20^](#fn20){ref-type="fn"} Children, Freud posits, imagine a narrative or 'romance' in which 'both \[of their\] parents are replaced by others of better birth'[^21^](#fn21){ref-type="fn"} in order to liberate themselves 'from the authority of \[their\] parents'.[^22^](#fn22){ref-type="fn"} That 'liberation', he continues, is 'one of the most painful results brought about by the course of \[children\'s\] development'.[^23^](#fn23){ref-type="fn"} Psychoanalyst and Freud\'s daughter, Anna Freud, explained it thus: 'Most children of early school age (6--10) possess a secret daydream (the "family romance") which deals with their descent from royal or lordly parents who have only entrusted them to their real more humble families ... On the part of the child these fantasies are attempts to deal with the whole range of conflicting emotions toward the parents.'[^24^](#fn24){ref-type="fn"}

Modern psychoanalysis views Freud\'s theory of the 'family romance' as one that describes a phenomenon that is nearly 'universal' for adoptees but common even for those who know and were raised by their biological parents: the 'child\'s \[natural\] curiosity about growth'[^25^](#fn25){ref-type="fn"} and '\[t\]he expectable inquiries children routinely make of their parents concerning the past'.[^26^](#fn26){ref-type="fn"} For 'both adopted and unadopted children', scholars write, 'beginning between ages 8 and 11, family romances represent not only fantasies but also conjectures about the existence and location of, as well as possible reunions with, "real" biological parents'.[^27^](#fn27){ref-type="fn"} While an outlet for children who have been dislocated 'from \[their\] families of origin'[^28^](#fn28){ref-type="fn"}---eg abandoned children, adoptees---family romances are also present, as Freud speculated, for children who are raised in families where biological paternity and maternity are certain: "In the current generation, the re-established practice of open adoptions and the emergence of sperm banking, surrogate mothering, and the conspicuous public appeals for help in locating missing children, pose new adaptive challenges to adoptive families and children. Indeed, they constitute the modern analogues of the tales, legends, and other romances about the fates of displaced children and adults that have been delivered across generations. However, these practices affect the unadopted child, too, who must not be taken to be so oblivious to social and societal themes and preoccupations.[^29^](#fn29){ref-type="fn"}"

The preceding remarks suggest that origins anxiety is particularly acute in an age where families are dislocated for social and economic reasons, and where advances in the reproductive arena render possible the separation of biological and social parenthood. They also suggest that many people are touched by origins anxiety, even if certain cohorts, like adoptees and donor offspring, ostensibly feel its pang to a greater degree. Indeed, 'there is something universal about rootedness',[^30^](#fn30){ref-type="fn"} cultural and literary critic Christy Wampole writes, and the idea of rootedness 'appeals to people \[today\]... now more than ever',[^31^](#fn31){ref-type="fn"} especially given the increasing alienation and isolation that individuals feel in a society dominated by virtual networks. '\[T\]he greater the level of alienation,' Wampole notes, 'the more precious roots become.'[^32^](#fn32){ref-type="fn"}

At the same time, it is important to note that origins anxiety is not a distinctly modern phenomenon. Literary scholar Rachel Bowlby observes that the traditional biological family comprised of father, mother, and their sexually-conceived children---the kind of family purportedly immune from origins anxiety---was a brief, and now fading, blip on the American family scene.[^33^](#fn33){ref-type="fn"} Even more, Bowlby reminds us that origins anxiety has been the subject of some of the Western canon\'s oldest texts, including the text whose eponymous figure was converted by Freud 'into a modern name for Everyman---or Everyboy': Oedipus Rex.[^34^](#fn34){ref-type="fn"} 'Sophocles' Oedipus,' she says, 'is not at all about the desires or hatreds of a small child in relation to its parents. It is, however, about an older or grown child\'s need to know his origins.'[^35^](#fn35){ref-type="fn"} While part of Oedipus' appeal lies in the psychosexual drama that Freud distilled from Sophocles' tragedy, it also lies, as Bowlby shows, in its compelling treatment of origins anxiety: an emotion felt by most of us---by 'Everyman'---no less in the past than today.

Psychoanalysis and literary criticism provide a perspective on anonymity anxiety that even the most nuanced work on gamete donor anonymity overlooks. Critical discourse on anonymity anxiety tends to assume that anonymity anxiety and its related symptoms are uniquely associated with non-traditional methods of family formation, like anonymous gamete donation; at the very least, that discourse never acknowledges the possibility that anonymity anxiety might be part and parcel of a nearly universal human condition: origins anxiety. Unlike that discourse, the texts briefly surveyed here suggest that the donor conceived are not alone in feeling anxiety over their origins. To the contrary, those texts suggest that such anxiety, and corresponding need for familial connection, might affect many of us.

 . III. RETHINKING ANONYMITY REGULATION {#sec4}
=======================================

The observations made in Part II suggest a range of problems with abolishing gamete donor anonymity beyond those already identified by the authors of 'Gamete Donor Anonymity'. In the interest of brevity, I here mention two.

First, if it is true that the symptoms of anonymity anxiety are felt, to varying degrees, by most individuals regardless of the origin of their conception, then eliminating donor anonymity for non-sexual procreators might very well be ineffective. If even sexually-conceived offspring who know their progenitors feel many of the same emotions associated in critical discourse with anonymous donation---familial fantasizing, alienation, rootlessness, disorientation, and genealogical confusion---then eliminating donor anonymity is not guaranteed to achieve the professed objectives of those who desire it. What it is very likely to do, though, is reduce the overall donor pool and thereby burden alternative procreators who rely on that pool in order to create families.[^36^](#fn36){ref-type="fn"}

Second, regulating alternative reproduction in order to alleviate harms that are nearly universally felt represents a normatively and constitutionally problematic example of what I have elsewhere termed 'regulating at the margins'.[^37^](#fn37){ref-type="fn"} Regulating at the margins occurs, I argue, when the law uses a marginal kinship practice like same-sex marriage or alternative reproduction as an occasion to imagine what the ideal family ought to look like for everyone. The procreation rationale for exclusionary marriage laws[^38^](#fn38){ref-type="fn"} was a problematic---and, according to the Supreme Court in *Obergefell v Hodges*, unconstitutional[^39^](#fn39){ref-type="fn"}---example of 'regulating at the margins' because it subjected same-sex couples, and only same-sex couples,[^40^](#fn40){ref-type="fn"} to the government\'s normative ideal of procreative marriage.[^41^](#fn41){ref-type="fn"}

As with same-sex marriage prohibitions, laws that eliminate donor anonymity in order to alleviate anonymity anxiety and its associated harms are a constitutionally deficient example of regulating at the margins. Many progenitors of children who are sexually conceived are not legally compelled to reveal their identity to those children.[^42^](#fn42){ref-type="fn"} Moreover, no children of sexual procreators are guaranteed a familial connection with their progenitors, or at least the kind of familial connection that some donor offspring appear to desire. Laws eliminating donor anonymity, however, attempt to impose those normative ideals on alternative procreators---and only on alternative procreators---*even though sexual procreators create children who also search, often in vain, to satisfy those ideals*. Moreover, laws eliminating donor anonymity would impose those ideals on alternative procreators *without any guarantee that many of those ideals would, in fact, be achieved*.

 . IV. CONCLUSION {#sec5}
=================

Along with the fact that most respondents who took Nelson, Hertz, and Kramer\'s survey were close to 'neutral' on the issue of donor anonymity,[^43^](#fn43){ref-type="fn"} the ambiguity surrounding the meanings of anonymity and non-anonymity both in this survey specifically and in debates about donor anonymity more generally suggest that regulators ought to proceed with caution before altering the *status quo* of donor anonymity. Even more, the potential universality of the purported harms associated with donor anonymity might give regulators and mandatory disclosure proponents pause before eliminating anonymity. Anonymity anxiety, this commentary suggests, shares much in common with the 'family romances' and origins anxiety that we all are thought to have to varying degrees---'romances' and anxieties that arise even when we know our progenitors and are in a relationship with them. If that is right, then it is by no means clear that mandatory non-anonymity will achieve the result that so many donor offspring desire.

In addition, if the anxiety that is often uniquely linked to donor anonymity in discussions about that practice is one that we all feel to one extent or another, then we must consider whether it is fair (and constitutional) to target the so-called problem of origins anxiety 'at the margins'. Subjecting a marginal reproductive practice (alternative reproduction) to regulatory burdens from which a central reproductive practice (sexual reproduction) is largely, if not completely, exempt is constitutionally problematic if the right to procreate is shared equally by sexual and non-sexual procreators[^44^](#fn44){ref-type="fn"}---and especially problematic if those regulatory burdens are unlikely to achieve their desired result. 'Regulating at the margins' was rejected by courts as constitutionally deficient in the same-sex marriage context and is no less objectionable here.
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